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B LACKSTONE was a scholarly politician with a marked literary
bent. In a way he was rather like Cicero. Both wrote extensively
but, at least in the area of philosophy, the ideas of neither were parti-
cularly marked with invention.' But otherwise Blackstone did not in
the slightest resemble Cicero, the McCarthyesque politician, of whom
Blackstone apparently disapproved. As a Revolutionary Whig (1688
brand) Blackstone was a man of moderate political views; he might
be described as a conservative progressive, even possibly, when Dis-
senters and Roman Catholics were concerned.' As a politician he seems
to rationalize that English institutions of the day existed for the pub-
lic good,4 and he is a master at systematizing inconsistencies.! While
his learning has been much exaggerated by some of his admirers, it
was certainly extensive,' and though it may be very much doubted
* B.A., University of Texas; B.A., B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University; Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
The author expresses his appreciation to Professor Harry W. Jones of Columbia University
School of Law for his helpful advice and criticism.
1 See pp. 406-07 infra. But, as Dicey remarks, the Commentaries as a whole was a work of
tremendous originality and it was recognized as such by its earliest readers. Dicey, Black-
stone's Commentaries, 44 The National Review 653 (1909), reprinted in 4 Camb. L.J. 286
(1932). It is this reprint that is elsewhere referred to in this Article.
'See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 61 (9th ed. 1783); Douglas (Glenbervie), The Bio-
graphical History of Sir William Blackstone, 75-77 (1782). The edition of the Commen-
taries here cited is the one on which Blackstone was working at the time of his death. The
author is indebted to C. E. Stevens, Esq., Fellow, Lecturer in Classics and sometime Vice-
President of Magdalen College. Oxford, for the apt description of the similarity of techniques
of Senators Cicero and McCarthy.
a For a rebuttal of Bentham's charges of utter standpatness, see 12 Holdsworth, A His-
tory of English Law, 728-29 (1938). But as Dicey points out, his apologetics for the es-
tablished regime of things could sometimes verge on absurdity-at times, on whimsicality.
Dicey, supra note 1, at 292.
' 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 50-51. Of public institutions of the time, they probably
were the best.
'In speaking of natural liberty Blackstone commends the Act for Buying in Woollen, 30
Car. 2 c. 3 (1678), "which prescribes a thing seemingly as indifferent [as] . . . a dress for
the dead, who are all ordered to be buried in woolen . . . [as] a law consistent with public
liberty; for it encourages the staple [i.e., wool] trade, on which in great measure depends
the universal good of the nation." I Blackstone, Commentaries 126. See also p. 402 infra.
' See Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 718.
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that he ever deliberately misstated facts,' his logic can often be ques-
tioned!
Blackstone's advocacy was said to have been something less than
sparkling in the way of eloquence,' but this failing could not be
guessed from a reading of the Commentaries where "the purity and
elegance of his style," as Kent described it, is most marked. Even his
severest contemporary detractors-Bentham, Gibbon, and Priestly
among them-have remarked on the beauty of his prose. The source
of the Commentaries was a series of lectures Blackstone delivered to
students-at six guineas a head-between 1753 and 1766.0 The pur-
pose of these lectures and the published counterpart 1 was "to teach
English law to laymen. He did not pretend, otherwise than inciden-
tally, to teach jurisprudence ... [and] he would have been surprised
indeed had he been called a philosopher." 2 He sought to give college
boys some knowledge of the law under which they lived;"3 these boys
were between fifteen and eighteen years of age.' To us his Latin
quotations may sometimes seem pedantic, and his examples relating
to the doings of Titius and Caius seem stilted. His case for the per-
fection of the common law is often too strongly stated"1 and his logic
For example, Blackstone says that the Saxons used the writs of entry to recover land.
3 Blackstone, Commentaries 184. While this is palpable nonsense, Blackstone cited authority
for the statement, thus indicating his belief in its correctness.
8See, e.g., Maine, Ancient Law 152 (8th ed. 1880), with respect to the inability
of the half-blood to inherit and Blackstone's explanation of this state of the law. See also
Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law 123-24 (2d ed. 1958).
9 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 72.
a0 See Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 720. Blackstone was appointed the first Vineri-
an Professor of English Law at Oxford University in 1758. His first Vinerian lecture, a
discourse on the study of law, was delivered on October 25, 1758. Fifoot notes that the
manuscript of Blackstone's lectures in All Soul's College, Oxford, indicates that Blackstone
departed from them considerably in writing the Commentaries, which unlike the lectures
were much influenced by Lord Mansfield's early judgments. Fifoot, History and Sources
of the Common Law 367 note, 407 note (1949); Fifoot, Lord Mansfield 26, 84, 127-28, 141
(1936).
" The first volume appeared in 1765.5 1Hanbury, Blackstone in Retrospect, 66 Law Q. Rev. 318, 321 (1950).
" The advertisement for his first series of lectures, reprinted in Dicey, supra note 1, at
298-99, reads in part as follows: "This course is calculated not only for the Use of such
Gentlemen of the University, as are more immediately designed for the Profession of the
Common Law, but of such others also, as are desirous to be in some Degree acquainted with
the Constitution and Polity of their own Country." For an account of the continuing de-
bate on teaching law to undergraduates, see Freund, Law and the Universities, 1953 Wash.
U.L.Q. 367; Berman, On the Teaching of Law in the Liberal Arts Curriculum (1956).
"'Bentham was subjected to Blackstone's lectures in 1763, presumably in Michaelmas
term. At that time he was fifteen years old.
For example, Blackstone defended the curious laws relating to the theft of domesti-
cated wild animals by stating: "It is also as much felony by common law to steal such of
them [i.e., domesticated wild animals] as are fit for food, as it is to steal tame animals: but
not so if they are only kept for the pleasure, curiosity, or whim, as dogs, bears, cats, apes,
parrots, and singing birds; because their value is not intrinsic, but depending only on the
caprice of the owner." 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 393.
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is sometimes at cross purposes."6 His compulsion to classify and order
is often too pronounced and his notions of jurisprudence" and civil
government" are oversimplified, garbled, and overly pious. But it
must be borne in mind that he was addressing classically-trained
schoolboys, and in his own time it was said that he made legal study
so pleasant and agreeable that students constantly turned from the-
ology to study law."9
The Commentaries, which ran through eight English editions and
several more American ones in his lifetime, probably sold far better
than Blackstone could have expected. Before the Revolution one
thousand English sets at ten pounds a set were sold in America and
many more American editions sold at the bargain price of three
pounds a set.2" In fact, before the war broke out almost as many sets
were sold in the American colonies as in England. The work had an
enormous effect in America not because of the "social consistency"
of Blackstone's thinking,2 but because it was the only general
treatise available in a land where well-trained lawyers were almost
non-existent. It is fair to add that in both England and America the
work revolutionized legal education. 2
The work was cited in court in Blackstone's lifetime," though never
by Blackstone himself, either as an advocate or a judge. The simplicity
and breadth of Blackstone's exposition perhaps influenced the practice
in early American courts to argue from general principles rather than
narrow precedents,' and it is said that during the period from 1789
to 1915, the authority of the Commentaries was cited ten thousand
times in reported American cases."
As a person, Blackstone was stiff, stuffy, and pompous from child-
26 See Blackstone's remarks about the "absolute right" of property and the exercise of
the right of eminent domain. I Blackstone, Commentaries 138-39.
17 See pp. 402-06 infra.
" See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 50-51, and text accompanying note 4 supra.
'" Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone 168 (1938). This contemporary reaction is inter-
esting in the light of Bentham's furious response to Blackstone's lectures.
" Id. at 170. The first edition had sold in England for four guineas. Later editions sold
there for as little as thirty shillings. Id. at 1 56.
as See Boorstin, op. cit. supra note 8, at 190, where this aspect of Blackstone's approach is
analyzed. In the preface to the new edition which is merely a reprint of the earlier one, the
author says that he would modify his Conclusion, from which the quotation in the text is
taken, were he to rewrite the book.
"2 In England, the revolution was the introduction of English law as a subject for un-
dergraduate university study. In America Blackstone furnished a comprehensive treatise with
which the whole of English law could be studied, whereas the American lawyer had pre-
viously learned his profession chiefly by apprenticeship. The existence of the Commentaries
may have prompted the teaching of law in American universities as well.
23 For points of law, not jurisprudence. Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 109-10.
" Goebel, The Common Law and the Constitution, in Chief Justice John Marshall, a
reappraisal 101, 108 (Jones ed. 1956).
" Lockmiller, op. cit. supra note 19, at 181.
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hood and as a professor and judge he felt it his duty to become
more so."' His manner-as much as what he had to say-may have
been responsible for driving Bentham at fifteen to his initial reaction
of repulsion which led to his founding the later English school of
jurisprudence.'
I1. BLACKSTONE'S THEORY OF LAW
As tradition demanded that a writer of a students' general treatise
should define his subject and give it an ethical basis, Blackstone com-
menced his treatise with a definition of "the nature of laws in general"
and an explanation of the source of law and its moral functions. But
whereas most philosophers commence their philosophical works with
a discourse on their theory of knowledge, Blackstone did not do so.
Indeed, he seems to have been unequipped with any general theory
of knowledge, except that he seems to presuppose that man possesses
God-given reason."
It is difficult to describe Blackstone's jurisprudential writing be-
cause it is so contradictory, muddled, and disorderly." Blackstone
seems to have taken for granted that the natural law definition of
law was the definition, though he embellished and distorted that
definition to a point that his views are at times heretical. In fact his
hybrid definition of law was self-contradictory. Law, he said, "is a
rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a State,
commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."30 This
is a masterpiece of fence-straddling. Blackstone made seeming sense
of two basically incompatible ideas: the Hobbesian idea of law based
on power and the conventional natural law doctrine of law as reason
with a moral content." The disparity of Blackstone's definition with
2 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 86.
" Sir Henry Maine is quoted by Blackstone's biographer in the Dictionary of National
Biography as saying that Blackstone's discussion of the nature of laws in general "may almost
be said to have made Bentham and Austin into jurists by virtue of sheer repulsion."
" I Blackstone, Commentaries 39-42.
"Gibbon's first serious writing in English was a critical abstract of the Commentaries.
He did not abstract the chapter "On the Nature of Laws in General," however. "I have
entirely omitted a metaphysical enquiry upon the nature of Laws in General, eternal and
positive laws, and a number of sublime terms, which I admire as much as I can without un-
derstanding them." Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 751-53. For another near-contem-
porary adverse comment, see Sedgwick, Remarks, Critical and Miscellaneous, on The Com-
mentaries of Sir William Blackstone 1-11 (2d ed. 1807).
0 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 44.
" In English jurisprudence the latter view had been principally associated with Coke. A
nice analysis of Blackstone's hybrid definition is found in Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense
and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 836-38 (1935). At page 838 Cohen
makes this critical observation: "Perhaps the chief usefulness of the Blackstonian theory is
the gag it places upon legal criticism. Obviously, if the law is something that commands
what is right and prohibits what is wrong, it is impossible to argue about the goodness or
[Vol. 13
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that of pure natural law can be best demonstrated by putting Black-
stone's definition in juxtaposition to that of Thomas Aquinas, viz.,
that law is "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by
him who has care of the community, and promulgated.""2
Blackstone expressed the traditional view that natural law was
universal, God-given, and perfect,33 and though he asserted that
human law might be contrary to it, that situation never seems to have
cropped up in English law, with the possible exception of the late
survival of the principle of slavery which he glosses over very neatly."
By definition law was essentially natural reason, a timeless web merg-
ing the ideal and the actual-a combination of reason and nature, of
enlightenment and Natural Providence. But here one encounters
another contradiction in Blackstone's thinking. English law was the
perfection of ideas conceived by the ancient Saxons in primitive con-
ditions and capable of automatic and inevitable perfectability by
natural processes.35 (Legislative improvement was occasionally ad-
mitted but not advised.)
Law was a rule-or set of rules-of action5 devised by God and
man for the protection of society. The perpetual law-the law of
badness of any law, and any definition that deters people from critcism of the law is very
useful to legal apologists for the existing order of society."
" Summa Theologica, I-II, Question 90, Art. 4, in Bigoniari, ed., The Political Ideas
of St. Thomas Aquinas 9 (1957).
" 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 38-42. Boorstin, op. cit. supra note 8, at 60, makes this
observation of Blackstone's natural law heresy: "As one could discover what the laws of
England were by examining the laws of nature, so one could discover the laws of nature
from looking at the laws of England." I have been unable to find any clear statements in the
Commentaries to this effect.
" 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 423-25. See also 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 127 and 2
Blackstone, Commentaries 402. Blackstone is somewhat equivocal as to slavery. Though the
Commentaries speak out loudly against slavery (1 Blackstone, Commentaries 423), Black-
stone finally says that a slave entering England became a free man, although he is still bound
to perform "perpetual service" for his master-as a sort of apprentice for life. 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries 424-25. In I Blackstone, Commentaries 127, Blackstone says that "the mas-
ter's right to his [the slave's] service may possibly still continue." Blackstone protested to
Granville Sharp for quoting from Book 1, Chapter 1, to show that Blackstone stood de-
cisively behind Sharp's position. Letter, William Blackstone to Granville Sharp, February 20,
1769, MS copy on file in the New York Historical Society Library. Sharp had sent Black-
stone the manuscript of his forthcoming book against slavery for criticism. There Black-
stone also points out that since the status of a slave in England was then sub judice, he could
not make a positive statement on the point. But it is a little curious that once the matter
was finally settled by Lord Mansfield in Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.
1772), Blackstone made no reference to this case in the later editions of his work. For Lord
Mansfield's own ambivalence on the issue of slavery see Fifoot, Lord Mansfield 41-42 (1936).
In the light of what he says in the Commentaries, it is rather surprising to read what
Blackstone went on to say in the letter above referred to. Though he states that the matter
of villenage was "totally distinct from that of Negro Slaving," he proceeds to say that "as
villenage was allowed by the common law, it cannot be argued that a state of Servitude is
absolutely unknown to and inconsistent therewith."
'Some similar notions concerning the ancient tribal law and its significance are en-
countered in Savigny.
" I Blackstone, Commentaries 38.
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Nature-was devised by God,"' but according to God's will, rather
than His reason,8 Blackstone says heretically." It is known in part by
reason and in part by revelation and is binding on all mankind. Its
three basic (and, in Bentham's view, meaningless") principles ' were
(1) to live uprightly, (2) to harm no one, and (3) to give everyone
his due. Man's reason supplied the embellishments for these principles.
Human law that transgressed natural law, however, was not law
and must be disobeyed. But on the following page Blackstone lays
down his hybrid definition of law which, with the Hobbesian element
he introduces, could scarcely be disobeyed.3 This definition, then,
cannot pass as natural law doctrine unless intended as a definition of
human law and then it is inaccurate, except as an ideal, in the light
of what Blackstone says elsewhere. Finally, he finds that law favors
the pursuit of happiness by man," but (and this seems pure heresy)
the basis for obligation is penalty."
Blackstone often fails to picture English law in the traditional
terms of natural law, but rather he describes two sorts of human law
in conflict-the ancient, simple (and imaginary") Anglo-Saxon
system, which he somehow equated to natural law in a rough sense,47
and the later glosses of the Normans and their successors.4 ' The aim
of English law, then, as Blackstone saw it, was to return the English-
man to the ideal primitive state" long since departed from, at least
in part."
In the laws of other nations Blackstone found analogies to show
the universality of certain principles of English law, but he rarely
used the positive provisions of the law of Nature to defend English
legal institutions. He does assert that " 'the legislation and course of
7 Id. at 39-40.
38 Ibid.
" See the note on page 40 of Sharswood's edition of the Commentaries (1900). Compare
Blackstone's statement with the orthodox definition of natural law of Thomas Aquinas at
pp. 402-03 supra. For a brief study of Aquinas's definition see Davitt, St. Thomas Aquinas
and the Natural Law, in Origins of the Natural Law Tradition 26 (Harding ed. 1954).
40Bentham, a Comment on the Commentaries 39-40 (1928).
4 Derived from Justinian's Inst. 1.1.3.
41 Blackstone, Commentaries 43.
43 Id. at 44.
44 Id. at 40.
4' Id. at 56-57.
48 But not to Blackstone. Temperamentally the antiquarian, Blackstone frequently over-
stressed the lore of the past and sometimes manufactured it. But to him it was very real.
47 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 66-67.
" Bentham's criticism of Blackstone's standpatness with respect to procedure is unfair.
Blackstone thought that it often consisted of excrescences of later-i.e., post-Saxon--times.
See, e.g., 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 305-306.
4' As described in 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 39-40, 43.
a"A trace of the ancient myth of the laws of Edward tle Confessor, allegedly set aside
by the Conqueror, can be seen here.
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laws in England'5' were peculiarly adapted for the protection of in-
dividuals in the enjoyment 'of those absolute rights which were in-
vested in them by the immutable laws of nature'5" and which might 'be
summed up in one general appellation and denominated the natural
liberty of mankind'."53 Some have argued that this is the only respect
in which Blackstone really equated English law with the law of
Nature." But he does purport to test English law by a pseudo-natural
law device of his own design. It is this device, as Professor Hart thinks,
that aroused Bentham's "remarkable tirade of invective against
Blackstone's references ... to the law of nature."5
Blackstone's testing device rests on the principle of natural law
that is his own distinctive contribution. Following the traditional
pattern, Blackstone asserts that there are areas not governed by
natural law (breaches of which would be malum in se if it existed),
and these areas are governed only by human law, whose breach is
merely malum prohibitum.' At first glance this looks guileless and
catholic enough, but it seems that in Blackstone's view all the rules
of English law, at least all those he chooses to test, fall into the latter
category. Then, in fact, in Blackstone's view (as formulated by Pro-
fessor Hart) "the law of nature consists almost wholly of gaps: ... a
net through which virtually everything must fall."" Then Blackstone
formulates his test for any rule of English law: Is it in the area of
natural or human law? Human. Then it is in accordance with natural
law, since not "contradicted" by it. Q.E.D.5 An essential part of this
area of Blackstone's "ramshacke"' thought is his insistence on the
distinction between acts that are malum in se and those that are simply
malum prohibitum, against which conscience did not operate. This
view toward the purely penal law and the legal consequences with
respect to its breach had considerable currency in the eighteenth cen-
511 Blackstone, Commentaries 127.
5 2 Id. at 124.
" Id. at 125. This and the analysis of the "gap" theory of natural law are derived from
Hart, Blackstone's Use of the Law of Nature, Butterworth's So. African L. Rev. 169 (1956).
" Ibid.; Jones, Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law 90 (1940); Graveson, The
Restless Spirit of English Law, in Jeremy Bentham and the Law 101, 104 (1948). Blackstone
does say, however, that actions for money had and received "do not arise from the determi-
nation of any court, or the positive direction of any statute, but from natural reason, and
the just construction of law." 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 162. His text, at 163, incorporates
a quotation of Lord Mansfield's judgment in Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97
Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (1760).
55 Hart, supra note 53, at 169-70.
" 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 57-58. Cf. Dabin on the "morally indifferent act." Dabin,
General Theory of Law in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch & Dabin 456-59 (Wilk
trans. 1950).
" Hart, supra note 53, at 174.
5' Id. at 171-72.
"Dunning, A History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer 75 (1926).
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tury but would probably be condemned by many natural lawyers
today."
III. THE SOURCES OF BLACKSTONE'S JURISPRUDENTIAL IDEAS
If there is conflict and muddle in Blackstone's jurisprudential
ideas, it is of some interest to determine from whence he extracted
them. For what he says of the substantive law of England he must
have relied heavily on his professional experience and his antiquarian
researches; but his theories of jurisprudence are fairly clearly drawn
in large measure at first and second hand from continental writers.
His political science theories are derived, apart from classical sources,
from Montesquieu and Locke." As Bentham so cogently points out"'
he both rejects and accepts the social compact theory, rejecting it in
fact but, with the reality of the Glorious Revolution so near at hand,
accepting it in theory. Thus, as is the case in his jurisprudential writ-
ing, Blackstone is an on-the-one-hand-this-on-the-other-hand-that
commentator on political science. In the area of the law of nations his
ideas greatly reflect those of Puffendorf and Grotius.6a
As for the source of his jurisprudential ideas, opinions vary. Of the
second section of his introduction to the Commentaries entitled "Of
the Nature of Laws in General" Bentham says that it is "the charac-
teristic part of our Author's work, and that which was most his own.
The rest was little more than compilation."" However, Sir Henry
Maine asserts that this section is lifted ("transcribed .. .textually")
from Burlamaqui" and one of Blackstone's biographers66 reasserts
this notion of direct copying ("the very words being sometimes re-
produced") and identifies the source as Part 1, Chapter 8 of Bur-
lamaqui's Principles of the Law of Nature, 1748 edition, translated
by Nugent. He twits Blackstone for not admitting his source and
Bentham, in turn, for having failed to detect it. Bentham did, in
"See Davitt, The Nature of Law 226-27 (1951).
6See Heatly, Fox, Montesquieu and Blackstone, 35 Law Q. Rev. 339 (1919). See 3
Blackstone, Commentaries 160 for a reference to the social compact with regard to implied
contracts.62 Bentham, A Fragment on Government 135-36 (Montague ed. 1891).
63 See, e.g., I Blackstone, Commentaries 43 where Blackstone cites Puffendorf.
64 Bentham, op. cit. supra note 62, at 96.
6Maine, Ancient Law 114 (8th ed. 1880).
66 Gerald P. Moriarty in the Dictionary of National Biography,
67 This would have cut Bentham deeply, for Burlamaqui's biographer in the Encyclopedia
Britannica (I Ith ed.) characterizes Burlamaqui as a "rational utilitarian." To this Hanbury's
observations on Bentham may be added: "Much of his criticism of Blackstone recoils on the
critic, for Bentham's idea of utility was essentially natural law under another name: Paton
(Textbook of Jurisprudence, 93) put it well thus, 'For all Bentham's scorn of natural law,
his standard of utility is typical of much natural law writing, and the actual term sdilitias
was used in the Middle Ages.' Again Maine is unanswerable when he calls the assumptions un-
[Vol. 13
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fact, assert that Blackstone might have described his law of Nature
as "these conciets of Grotius, Puffendorf, Woolaston, Burlamaqui and
my own."" Holdsworth" asserts that Blackstone's ultimate source was
Grotius whose ideas were transmitted to Blackstone by Burlamaqui.
Nevertheless, the principle reason why Blackstone failed to admit his
textual cribbing from Burlamaqui and Bentham failed to deduce it'
is that the "word for word" attribution is untrue. There are indeed
some similarities: (1) Nugent's Burlamaqui's Chapter 8 is entitled
"Of Law in General"; (2) like Blackstone,"" Nugent's Burlamaqui
identifies the attributes of the Creator as infinite power, wisdom, and
goodness; and (3) there are a few other instances of close similarity. 3
But these similarities, however striking, can prove little more than
that Blackstone had Nugent's Burlamaqui at his elbow along with the
works of other writers mentioned, particularly Locke and Mont-
esquieu.
Blackstone clearly did not transcribe Burlamaqui though he may
have borrowed some of his ideas. Burlamaqui is much more the con-
ventional natural law jurisprudent than Blackstone, whose views may
be said to be a pastiche of natural law and his own inventions, among
others. Although it says something for the lucidity of Blackstone's
prose that those passages on jurisprudence which are confused or even
silly are so easily found and exposed. As a natural lawyer, then, Black-
stone was clearly something of a maverick.
IV. NATURAL LAW IN BLACKSTONE'S ADVOCACY
Though Blackstone may not have been an eloquent advocate," in
the years in which he was most active in preparing, writing, and re-
writing the Commentaries, he argued a number of cases of land-mark
importance and sometimes had primary resort to arguments of reason,
justice, and universal law.
In his own reports for the period before he became a judge (1746-
1769) are twenty-eight cases in which he took a part. The most sig-
derlying the Roman idea of natural law 'the ancient counterpart of Benthamism.' (Ancient
Law, Pollock's ed. 84). Cf. Essay by Friedmann and Ayer in Jeremy Bentham and the Law,
233 at 245." Hanbury, supra note 12, at 319.
as Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries 44 (1928).
61 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 3, at 733, citing Glasson, 5 Histoire de Droit et des
Institutions de L'Angleterre, 398-99.
'0 At least in his writing published in the nineteenth century.
71 See note 69, supra.
71l Blackstone, Commentaries 40.
" E.g., compare 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 44 (middle) with Nugent's Burlamaqui 78
(top); compare 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 44, 45 (bottom), 46 (bottom) with Nugent's
Burlamaqui 78 (bottom); compare I Blackstone, Commentaries 49 with Nugent's Burla-
maqui 80 (bottom).
" Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 72.
19s9]
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nificant ones as regards arguments based to some extent on natural
law (nine of the twenty-eight) took place before 1765, when Black-
stone was preparing and delivering his lectures from which the Com-
mentaries evolved.
When Blackstone used natural law arguments, he seems to have
tailored them carefully to suit the bench before whom he appeared.
That his delivery was not of the highest quality may be quite true, but
that he was convincing to Lord Mansfield and his court can scarcely
be doubted. In 1760 he appeared before that court for the successful
defendant in Robinson v. Bland."' The facts of the case are well
known. In France, a gambling debt had been incurred and a loan
made for the purpose of gaming, and these two debts were subse-
quently sued on in England. Under most circumstances there opera-
tive, such debts were recoverable in France. Blackstone made a very
lucid argument based on the principles of natural justice." These
principles had to be made subject to certain curbs in English law in
order for the argument to be successful. His argument shows a nice
balance of natural justice, logic, and history and seems to have ap-
pealed to Lord Mansfield, who, after asking for further argument at
the term following that in which the really crucial arguments were
made, rendered judgement for the defendant," with the concurrence
of the other members of the bench who were present.
In 1761, in Tonson v. Collins,' a copyright case, he based his prin-
cipal argument on reason,"9 quoting Locke on the acquisition of
property by invention, but he also argued universal law"' and natural
justice."' In this case he successfully argued public convenience and
natural liberty as a guide to statutory interpretation, but two years
later he was equally successful in his argument for literal statutory
construction before the same court."" Finally in Triquet v. Bath8 he
successfully argued the jus gentium with respect to diplomatic im-
munity in what is a leading case to this day."'
Perhaps, as a shrewd advocate, Blackstone merely fitted his argu-
ments to the known views of the strongwilled Lord Mansfield, who
presided over the Court of Kings Bench, but in so doing he put into
7 5 1 W. Bi. 234 & 256, at 238, 96 Eng. Rep. 129 & 141, at 131 (K.B. 1760).
7' Id. 237-46, 130-34.
77Id. at 258-61, 141-43.
71 1 W. B1. 321, 96 Eng. Rep. 180 (1761).
7' Ibid.
soId. at 322. 180.
" Id. at 323, 181.
"Stephen v. Coster, I W. BI. 424, 96 Eng. Rep. 241 (1762).
'3 1 W. BI. 471, 96 Eng. Rep. 273 (1764).
S4A companion case decided by Blackstone as a judge can be found in Rafel v. Verelst,
2 W. BI. 983, 96 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B. 1775).
[Vol. 13
BLACKSTONE, QUASI-JURISPRUDENT
practice the theoretical notions of his Commentaries and, in effect,
demonstrated their practical value to the student, regardless of their
jumbled exposition in the treatise.
V. THE NATURAL LAW OF THE JUDICIAL BLACKSTONE
The judicial Blackstone does not show a very strong cast of natural
law influence. Though Blackstone was certainly aware of what Mans-
field was doing in the way of building the commercial law 5 and
Mansfield's alleged departures from the common law,"8 Blackstone
was content to apply the law as he found it. Though he characterized
the Court of Common Pleas as being guided by the motto aequitas
augusti,s7 he had no enthusiasm for unbridled equity,"8 in which feel-
ing he was certainly joined by Bentham."
It is curious that Blackstone failed to report Perrin v. Blake on ap-
peal," where he rendered one of his most controversial, though
inconclusive, judgements. He certainly failed to go as far as Mans-
field in cutting the ground entirely out from under the Rule in
Shelley's Case, but he took the side that is generally regarded as that
of the angels in giving the Rule a liberal construction."' Although he
took the basic view favored by reason, the antiquarian Blackstone
dared not shake the fabric of English real property law too much and,
in effect, sat on the fence. For all this liberality-in the eighteenth
century sense-however, he was severly taken to task by Hargrave.
Elsewhere Blackstone was not nearly so hidebound as has generally
been supposed when justice and tradition were in conflict,"2 and some
degree of deference to justice in abstracto found its way into his
" 2 Blackstone, Commentaries 460.
8 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 123-24, citing a well-known public letter criticizing
Mansfield in 1770, of which Blackstone could scarcely have been unaware.
8""Equity of the highest." Id. at 121.
894 Blackstone, Commentaries 442; Douglas, op. cit. supra note 2, at 121-23; 1 Black-
stone, Commentaries 62. For an account of the Mansfieldian-Blackstonian view of English
equity, see Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1929). See
also Hanbury, Blackstone as a Judge, 3 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 1, 6, 17, 25 (1959).
8" Bentham, op. cit. supra note 62, at 96.
904 Burr. 2579, 98 Eng. Rep. 355 (K.B., 1770), rev'd. (Ex. Ch., 1772). For Black-
stone's judgment see 1 Hargrave, Law Tracts 487 (1787). A report of the King's Bench de-
cision in Perrin v. Blake may be found in I W. Bl. 672, 96 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B., 1769).
For other references to the case, see Hodgson v. Ambrose, 1 Doug. 337, 343 note, 99 Eng.
Rep. 216, 220 (K.B., 1780) and Hanbury, op. cit. supra note 88, at 17-18.
" Blackstone appears to have taken the position that the Rule should allow descendants
to take by purchase when the settlor's intentions to that effect are clear. 1 Hargrave, op. cit.
supra note 90, at 503. That Spurr, Sir William Blackstone's Influence on the Rule in Shelley's
Case, 17 Case and Comment 284-87 (1910), may be a bit garbled is perhaps accounted for
by the conflicting accounts of Perrin v. Blake in 1 W. Bl. 672-73, 4 Burr. 2479, and 1 Har-
grave, op. cit. supra note 90, at 487, 493, which is the best report of the case, though the
vote of Smyth, B. is not there recorded.
"See, e.g., Sparrow v. Cooper, 2 W. Bl. 1316, 96 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B., 1779).
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judgements." But though Blackstone, J., was not always happy with
the authorities, he lacked Lord Mansfield's courage to defy them in
the interest of justice. Here specious reasoning did not readily come
to his aid. 4 However, he spoke as a practical man with an insight
into contemporary commercial problems when he brushed aside tech-
nical arguments in favor of those that made the lot of the foreign
merchant easier." Although Blackstone sometimes alluded to reason
and justice on the bench, such references seem to be almost wholly
rhetorical as when he states in the Commentaries, in speaking of his
theory of precedent, that decisions "contrary to reason" are not law."
This passage of the Commentaries was preserved throughout Black-
stone's judgeship.'
As compared to his brother judges Blackstone was certainly one of
the least hidebound of the lot and should generally be classed as a
moderate in judicial attitude. It is true that he rarely dissented, but
in the cases he reports, his dissents (in a very undissent-prone court)
are more frequent than those of his brothers. Indeed, he is taken to
task by his contemporary biographer, Douglas," for his liberality
toward the exclusion of Founder's Kin at All Souls College and his
low opinion of Cicero" and by Hargrave for his liberal approach to
the Rule in Shelley's Case. He regarded himself as a moderate'. and
he clarified his position by saying that "amid the rage of contending
parties, a man of moderation, must expect to meet with no quarter,
from any side."'' .
VI. CONCLUSION
From his utterances as a barrister and judge one would conclude
that Blackstone's natural law ideas were not the guiding principles
of his legal life, though they may have influenced some of his argu-
ments as a barrister, especially those he made during the time that
he was writing and delivering his lectures. But it should be added
that he did not repudiate any of his natural law philosophy in later
"See Pound v. Milbank, 2 W. B1. 853, 96 Eng. Rep. 502 (K.B., 1772); Hitchin v.
Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 827, 96 Eng. Rep. 487 (K.B., 1772); Parson v. Lloyd 2 W. Bl. 845, 96
Eng. Rep. 498 (1772).
94See, e.g., Collier v. Gaillard, 2 W. Bl. 1063, 96 Eng. Rep. 625 (K.B., 1776). A slightly
whitewashed version of this case appears in Hanbury, supra note 88 at 8-9.
"Melchart v. Halfey, 2 W. Bl. 741, 96 Eng. Rep. 434 (K.B., 1771).
"6 See Boorstin, supra note 8, at 196 and Allen's reading of this passage there discussed.
"7 For a thorough study of Blackstone's judicial career, see Hanbury, supra note 88.
"Douglas op. cit. supra note 2, at 73-75.
" Id. at 75-76.
100 Id. at 85.
'0a In his answer to Priestley's Pamphlet. Slightly different wording is found in Riddell,
Some of Blackstone's Critics, 2 Temple L.Q. 111-12 (1928).
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editions of his work, and if the logic was sometimes woolly, Black-
stone either did not recognize this or did not think the errors suffi-
ciently important to revise that part of his work. Taking the Com-
mentaries as a whole, some have expressed the view that Blackstone's
introductory statements in the jurisprudential vein merely amount
to "a piece of decoration making for the beauty of the edifice, but
forming no part of its structure and certainly no part of its founda-
tion..... But even if Blackstone's natural law was merely conventional
rhetoric to act as an ethical base for his empirical system, it can be
scarely doubted that it contributed to molding the minds of the
generations of lawyers and judges in America where the Commentaries
was so slavishly studied and cited.
102 Hart, supra note 53, at 169. Bentham even doubted its decorative value unless
rendered into verse. "Verse is what his oracles like those of the ancient sages, would have
shew'd best in. . . . 'By all means . . . turn it into verse.' 'Into verse? Why so?' says the
Author. 'Why, because, then it will be verse . . . and now it's nothing'." Bentham, A Com-
ment on the Commentaries 35-36 note (1928).
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